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Abstract 
 
How can simple interactive models catalyze collective learning and action about local water management? This 
paper aims at providing an answer to this question by drawing on a Companion Modeling (ComMod) experiment 
on irrigation water sharing in a highland community of Northern Thailand. In a ComMod process, simulation 
models integrating different stakeholders’ points of view on the problem at stake are developed and used as 
communication platforms to facilitate the collective exploration and assessment of various possible future 
scenarios. In this case study, the ComMod process combined a preliminary diagnostic-analysis of the 
heterogeneous socio-political context, a Role-Playing Game (RPG) and an associated simple Agent-Based Model 
(ABM). An ABM was used to run simulations to stimulate a plenary debate and, later on, to facilitate discussions 
within small homogeneous groups of farmers. The various effects of the process on the participants in term of 
learning, communication, behavior change, and new practices were evaluated through series of individual 
interviews. This ComMod process stimulated individual and collective learning and coordination among multiple 
stakeholders exploring pathways to solve their common irrigation water use problem. We show that in 
participatory modeling, simple models can be useful to mediate water use conflicts and accommodate multiple 
interests among stakeholders. To do so the participatory aspects of the modeling and simulation process must 
be carefully managed. In particular, much attention needs to be paid to the initial socio-political context and its 
power inequities to ensure the genuine involvement of all concerned stakeholders, including the usually 
voiceless and resource-poor ones. 
 
Introduction 
 
In the highlands of Northern Thailand as in several upper watersheds around the world, water management 
issues are more and more complex and uncertain, involving an increasing number of stakeholders and 
combining more and more interacting agro-ecological and socio-economic dynamics (Johnson et al., 2001). To 
tackle such a complexity, researchers have built a wide range of models aimed at better understanding these 
issues and/or facilitating decision making processes in these complex systems (Costanza and Ruth, 1998). Box 
and Draper (1987) wrote that “all models are wrong, but some are useful”. Building up on this idea, we wonder 
how to produce useful models. More precisely, we wonder how simple models can catalyze collective learning 
and action about local water management.  
This paper aims at providing an answer to this question by drawing on a Companion Modeling (ComMod) 
experiment on irrigation water sharing in a highland community of Northern Thailand. In a ComMod process 
(which is participatory by its very nature), simulation models integrating different stakeholders’ points of view 
on the problem at stake are developed and used as communication platforms to facilitate the collective 
exploration and assessment of various possible future scenarios (Bousquet et al., 1999). In the ComMod 
process presented in this paper, we adopted a critical perspective, i.e. much attention was paid to the initial 
socio-political context and its power inequities to ensure the genuine involvement of all concerned stakeholders, 
including the usually voiceless and resource-poor ones. 
After a presentation of the context, methods and tools of the ComMod process conducted in the Akha 
community of Mae Salaep, this paper analyses the main effects of this process in terms of collective learning 
and action about local water management. To conclude with, we present the main lessons drawn from this 
experiment.      
   
The Companion Modeling Process conducted in Mae Salaep, Northern Thailand  
 
A ComMod approach  
ComMod is a continuous and iterative modeling process alternating field and laboratory activities in a cyclical 
way, its main successive phases being as follows: (i) Characterization of the problem, (ii) Modeling, i.e 
converting knowledge into a formal tool to be used as a simulator; and (iii) Simulations to explore various 
scenarios (Bousquet et al., 2005). Two kinds of simulation tools were used: Agent-Based Models (ABM) and 
Role Playing Games (RPG). According to Duke (1974), RPG is an excellent mode of communication to convey 
complexity as it allows multiple stakeholders to interactively examine the complex systems they are part of. 
Players can test alternative scenarios, but quickly this becomes costly and very time consuming and the 
number of participants remains limited. To alleviate these constraints, it is possible to build a simple 
computerized ABM, very similar to the RPG in its features and rules, but far more time-efficient to simulate 
scenarios and allowing a higher number of participants. Moreover, the RPG allows the players to understand the 
ABM model, to validate and criticize it, and later on to easily follow ABM simulations.  
Discussions about a specific problem in a ComMod cycle might raise new questions, which can then be 
examined in a following one. This is what happened in the ComMod process conducted in the village of Mae 
Salaep (Figure 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Successive ComMod cycles conducted in Mae Salaep, Chiang Rai Province, 2002-2007. 
 
Context of Mae Salaep catchment 
In this village located in a highland catchment of Chiang Rai Province, small-scale poor farmers are being 
rapidly integrated into the market economy. Over the last two decades, their former agrarian system based on 
swiddening was replaced by permanent cash-crop based agriculture. In the meanwhile, these changes led to an 
extensive socio-economic differentiation among farming households, characterized by different availability of 
productive resources, and different socio-economic and land-use strategies. Type A farmers are smallholders 
growing mainly maize for cash, while type B farmers hold self sufficient medium-sized farms and grow upland 
rice for self consumption in addition to maize. Some of these type A and B farmers have small non irrigated 
plantations of lychee or Assam tea. Type C farmers have relatively large and diversified farms, grow paddy rice 
and maize, and have extensive irrigated plantations of lychee or Oolong tea. In this context, after an initial 
ComMod cycle focusing on the interactions between soil erosion and crop diversification (Trébuil et al. 2002), 
the participants requested to focus the second cycle on the credit constraints to the adoption of non-erosive 
perennial crops such as tea and lychee (Barnaud et al. 2007, 2008). In a subsequent third cycle, which is 
presented in this article, the villagers requested to focus on water management at the catchment scale because 
these perennial crops require irrigation and their expansion in the catchment creates conflicts over water in the 
community. Presently, only a minority of relatively well-off farms have access to water to irrigate their 
plantations because of the first-come-first-served rule stipulating that once a farmer has set up irrigation pipes 
to draw water from a creek, other villagers cannot get water from its upstream section. Villagers also requested 
the participation to this ComMod cycle of the Tambon (sub-district) Administrative Organization (TAO) which is 
funding local projects such as the construction of small-scale water infrastructures. 
The initial socio-political context related to this water management problem involved several types of 
stakeholders with their own interests and perceptions of the issue at stake. Figure 2 is a matrix illustrating the 
relative influence and importance of these stakeholders. 
  
Figure 2. Matrix showing the relative influence and importance of the main stakeholders regarding the 
water management issue in Mae Salaep, northern Thailand.    
 
Type C farmers are well-off farmers belonging to influential clans of first settlers. Fifteen years ago, they 
started to irrigate their orchards and claimed that the first-come-first-served rule was an ancestral custom to 
regulate access to water. Using their high economic status and their traditional authority to exert power, they 
reinforced this rule when more villagers sought access to water. As a result, most of type A and B farmers do 
not have access to irrigation water. Some of them do not feel concerned by this issue since their plots are 
located above the streams and could not benefit from gravity irrigation anyway. But some others start to 
complain about the “lack of water” in the catchment, especially the farmers with small lychee plantations who 
could increase their production if they had access to irrigation water during dry season.  However, most of them 
do not question the first-come-first-served rule, since they are usually in a relation of dependence (or 
patronage) with the powerful type C clans from whom they borrow money when needed or work as daily hired 
labourers on their farms. Two opposing leaders played a key role in this ComMod cycle about water. The first 
one is one of the two elected villagers sitting on the TAO council. He recently concluded a deal with an external 
investor who bought a very large piece of land in the village catchment to plant Oolong tea in the future. As 
such a plantation would require a lot of irrigation water, he had a strong personal interest in participating to 
this ComMod process. Another key stakeholder of the process is the religious leader of the village Christian 
community (60% of the village population). He is a respected person in the village, not only as a religious 
leader but also as a leading innovator and a knowledgeable person for agricultural matters, actively supporting 
poor households facing difficulties (by providing technical advice, through free distribution of tea seedlings, 
etc.). He was the first one who suggested to the research team to use the ComMod tools to discuss about water 
management issues in the community.    
 
 
Methodology & tools 
This ComMod cycle started with field interviews about the water problem in the community and its related 
socio-political context. The RPG and the associated ABM used in the previous cycle were modified to address 
the irrigation water sharing issue and used in a three-day participatory workshop. On the first day, gaming 
sessions were organized with 12 villagers-players (box 1 and figure 3.b). After a first session played with rules 
corresponding to the current water use situation, a collective debriefing was organized for the participants to 
discuss the problems encountered in this gaming session and their possible solutions. A second gaming session 
allowed them to test these potential solutions by modifying the initial rules of the game. On the second day, 
individual interviews were conducted to better understand the players’ behaviors during the game and  the 
plenary discussions, to validate the model of the game, and to assess its learning effects. On the third day, 
participatory ABM simulations were conducted to support plenary discussions about possible future scenarios 
(figure 3.a). An original feature of this semi-autonomous or hybrid ABM lied in the possibility to run very 
interactive simulations in which some of the decisions were taken by the villagers, while others were taken by 
artificial agents. At each time step, the simulation stopped when it was time to allocate water among the 
farmers, and the 12 participants in  the game (corresponding to 12  “Farmer” agents in the model) had to 
decide together how they would allocate the water among them. Three weeks later, new simulations were 
conducted within smaller and more homogenous groups of farmers to accompany the evolution of discussions 
about water allocation in the village. To assess the short-term and mid-term effects of the ComMod process, 
individual interviews were conducted 3 weeks, 3 months and 10 months after the workshop.  
     
 
 
 The 12 participating villagers play the role of farming households managing their farm. They are 
given various amounts of land resources, family labor and financial means according to the actual 
farming conditions of the three main socio-economic types of farming households in the village
(types A, B and C for poor, medium and well-off farms respectively). Their plots are located on a 
3D gaming board representing a small catchment with two creeks running into a river. Each year, 
the players successively:   
- Go to the “credit desk” to ask for credit if needed,  
- Decide whether or not to send some family members to work off-farm in town,  
- Assign a given crop to each of their fields (taking the labour and financial constraints into 
account),  
- Decide whether or not to invest in water pipes for irrigation,  
- Go to the “market desk” to sell their farm products and to pay for their expenses, 
- Go to the credit desk to reimburse their credit if needed. 
The situation at the beginning of the game is similar to the situation of the village 20 years ago: 
the players have neither perennial crops nor pipes for irrigating them yet.  
The representation of the water system is highly simplified. Farmers can set up pipes in creeks for 
gravity irrigation. Depending on rainfall, that varies randomly each year, one creek can provide 
enough water for 1, 2, or 3 farms only. Players decide what rules for access to water are used. If 
there is not enough water for all the farms and if no agreement has been reached, priority is given 
to farms having pipes set up in the upstream section.  
 Box 1. Main principles of the Role-Playing Game focusing on water management in Mae Salaep. 
3.a. Model’s spatial interface 3.b. Gaming board 
  
Figure 3. Similarities between the gaming board and the spatial interface of the agent-based model used in the 
ComMod cycle focusing on water management at Mae Salaep, northern Thailand. 
 
Results 
 
Increased awareness of the problem to be solved collectively 
During the first gaming session, the players acted in the game as in reality: the well-off farmers urged to install 
their pipes first, and did not allow others to get water from the upstream sections later on. This highlighted the 
current conflict due to the first-come-first-served rule and increased the participants’ awareness of the problem, 
its urgency and the need to solve it collectively. As a village leader said during an interview: “no need to say 
anything, the game showed to everyone that we need to change the water allocation rules”.  
During interviews before the gaming sessions, well-off farmers who had access to water always said: ‘there is 
no water problem in the village, no conflict, everything is all right.’ They had obviously a good BATNA (Best 
Alternative To Non Agreement) and more interest in maintaining the statu quo than being part of a process 
raising the water problem. If the ComMod process had started with a more classical meeting in which 
communication skills prevail, the water sharing problem might not have been put on the agenda of the 
discussions. The game facilitated a different form of communication which allowed the less powerful villagers to 
raise this problem and to create a collective awareness of its existence.    
 
Exchanges of perceptions among stakeholders about the problem 
The ComMod process also stimulated exchanges of perceptions among the participants about their common 
water problem. 10 out of the 11 participants interviewed after the gaming sessions said that the game allowed 
them to better understand the other villagers’ situations, problems and/or perceptions. Players without access 
to water could see that “many villagers faced the same problem”, while well-off farmers with water access 
realized that the first-come-first-served rule would create more and more social tensions under the current 
expansion of irrigated plantations. Such a result might be surprising at first sight since these villagers belong to 
a small community in which they all know each other, but as a participant said: “in every day life, every one 
goes to his fields; we do not have such opportunities to discuss together.” 
 
Problem reframing and integrative negotiation of possible solutions 
Once the problem was identified, the ComMod activities facilitated a collective process of problem reframing 
and integrative (or win-win) negotiation. First, the TAO representative suggested to build a single reservoir for 
the village. This idea was rejected by the other players who feared that this would benefit only a minority of 
households. Later on the religious leader suggested to build small weirs on each creek and to share water 
among small groups of households. This idea was accepted by the majority by vote. It is interesting to notice 
that this leader did not openly put into question the first-come-first-served rule because he knew that the well-
off clans would not accept it. He suggested instead a more integrative solution which was acceptable to them: 
he said the problem was the lack of water, therefore new water storage infrastructure was needed to increase 
the volume of water available at the village level. Then, when such infrastructures would be built, farmers 
would have to discuss again about the water allocation rules. As several players stated, “new infrastructures are 
the only way to change the rules”. This was a typical integrative negotiation process in which stakeholders 
looked for solutions to “increase the size of the cake” instead of fighting about the way to “divide the cake”.     
 
Collective evaluation of solutions through interactive simulations 
The small weirs solution was collectively tested in the second gaming session. It stimulated discussions among 
players regarding the way to share water among beneficiaries of the weirs facilitated by the hybrid ABM. During 
the first set of participatory simulations in plenary session, the member of the sub-district administration (a 
well-off farmer) imposed to share water proportionally to the farmers’ plantation size. But three weeks later, 
the participants had continued to discuss this point, and during the simulations, within each small group, they 
collectively decided to simulate the sharing of equal volumes of water among them, adding that there should be 
a possibility to lend temporarily water rights to other farmers in case the volume of water available exceeded 
ones needs. This illustrates the importance of discussions occurring between field workshops and the necessity 
to monitor them and take them into account.   
 
 
Discussion 
 
Empowerment of the resource-poor stakeholders: a levelled playing field 
Aware of the fact that power inequities express themselves in a participatory process and of the subsequent 
risk of increasing social inequities, much attention was paid to the initial socio-political context to ensure the 
genuine involvement of all concerned stakeholders, including the usually voiceless ones. This ComMod process 
successfully empowered them in the negociation arena and allowed them to voice and assert their interests. 
This was achieved through a process of both personal and collective empowerment. The ComMod activities 
improved the participants’ self-confidence and supported the development of their capacity to understand the 
situation and imagine new solutions: ‘I am so proud. I did not know that I would be able to play the game, to 
think by myself about solutions,’ said a female participant. As for collective empowerment, 7 out of the 11 
interviewed participants claimed that the game made them realize that they were collectively ‘stronger’ or 
‘more intelligent’ (in their own words) than individually. This ComMod process also triggered a process of 
collective empowerment through the creation of alliances allowing the reinforcement of a counter power as the 
less powerful stakeholders realized that they could join a charismatic leader (the Christian leader) to make their 
voice louder. ‘If I think alone, I do not have good ideas. But if we think all together, we can all benefit from the 
good ideas of people like the Christian leader,’ said a woman.   
  
Negotiation with higher level institutions: the main limit of the process  
Ten months after the last workshop, the villagers had prepared a document to request funding from their TAO 
to build such new water infrastructure. Unfortunately, the president of this administration rejected their 
proposition, in spite of her previous discourses about the importance of villager’s participation in local politics 
and management of renewable resources. This was the main limit faced by this ComMod process and one of the 
key future challenges.     
 
Conclusion 
 
How can simple models catalyze collective learning and action about local water management? This paper 
demonstrates that a model’s usefulness relies much more on the modeling process than on the model itself. 
Moreover, although water management issues are complex, when the model aims at facilitating collective 
learning and communication, there is no need for exhaustive models computing a large amount of data, very 
simple models can be very useful. Their simplicity is even an advantage as it facilitates the understanding and 
appropriation of this model by local stakeholders. Such simple models also have the advantage to be highly 
adaptive, and can be easily modified to accompany evolving local stakeholders’ representations and 
preoccupations. However, the modeling process itself should not be “quick and simple”, but carefully 
participatory to ensure the genuine involvement of the concerned stakeholders.  
To sum up, what we call a carefully participatory process or a critical companion modelling process includes: (i) 
an initial analysis of the socio-political context to identify constraints to an equitable outcome of the process 
and to mitigate them by adapting the tools and methods used, (ii) the careful selection of participants to ensure 
that all participants are able to defend their interests and, eventually, to empower some of them through 
increased self-confidence and creation of alliances, (iii) the use of tools which are accessible to all kinds of 
stakeholders, whatever their level of formal education, (iv) the use of tools and methods highlighting the 
diversity of interests so that all interests are taken into account during the debates, even the usually voiceless’ 
ones, (v) the use of tools and methods favouring integrative or win-win negotiation processes which are 
acceptable to both influent and more marginal stakeholders, (vi) alternating plenary discussions, small group 
debates and individual interviews, to ensure that all stakeholders feel free to express themselves (sometimes 
not in the presence of the most powerful stakeholders), (vii) not to stop at the first apparent consensus as it 
often reflects the most powerful stakeholders’ opinion, (viii) a continuous and iterative process to favour and 
accompany discussions behind the scenes, where most of negotiation processes finally take place, and 
therefore (ix) the need for a specific monitoring and evaluation system to know what happens between two 
gaming and simulation field workshops.  
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